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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
NORMA LEE MADSEN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WALKER BANK & TRUST
CO:MPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
12822

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATElVIENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent
(hereafter called :Miss :Madsen) for damages for negligence in the handling of a $5,500 check payable to Miss
Madsen and deposited by her without endorsement in
her savings account with the Defendant-Appellant
bank (hereafter referred to "the Bank"}.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury, and the court submitted one special verdict only for the jury's determination: "The Defendant, Walker Bank & Trust Com-
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pany, was negligent in accepting and in forwarding the
check in eYidence without any endorsement." The jury
found the proposition "true." (R. 92). The court found
that the negligence of the Bank was the sole proximate
cause of l\Iiss l\Iadsen's loss of the amount of the check
(R. 126, 127) and awarded .l\Iiss l\Iadsen judgment
against the Uank in the amount of $5,500.00 plus in·
terest at 6% from December 5, 1969 and costs. (R.142).
The Bank's motions for Dismissal or for a Directed
Verdict; and for Judgment N.O.V. or for a new trial;
were denied. (R. 53-54, 93-95, 124).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Bank seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
District Court and a holding that recovery of damages
by l\Iiss l\1adsen is barred by her contributory negli·
gence in failing to endorse the check and by her war·
ranties to the Bank upon deposit of the check that she
would make it good if it was not paid.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Sometime prior to l\Iay of 1969, l\Iiss Madsen
loaned $5,000.00 to one Darrell G. Hafen. (R. 172).
She tried unsuccessfully to collect the loan for some
time. ( R. 173, 174) . In l\Iay of 1969 she was given .a
check for $5,050.00 by l\1r. Hafen drawn on a Virgima
bank. This check was returned marked "insufficient
funds" or "account closed." ( R. 173). In September
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of 1969, l\Ir. Hafen gave her a check on a Swiss bank,
which was returned unpaid twice. (R. 173, 174). On
December 4, 1969, Mr. Hafen gave Miss l\iadsen a
check for $5,500.00 drawn on the account of Dixie
:Minerals and "'\Vater, Inc., at the Draper Bank & Trust
Co. 11 She had demanded cash; l\fr. Hafen said that if
the money was in the bank it would be the same, and to
call the Draper Bank to confirm that money was there.
l\Iiss l\'fadsen took the check to the Sugarhouse Office
of "'\¥ alker Bank. She did not endorse the check. She
deposited a number of other checks, all of which she
endorsed. (R. 177-183). She gave the Hafen check to
a teller and asked the teller to telephone the Draper
Bank to determine if there were sufficient funds in the
Dixie l\Iinerals account to cover the check. (R. 183185). Upon receiving confirmation that sufficient funds
were in the Draper Bank account, Miss l\Iadsen deposited the check to her savings account. (R. 185). The
check was processed through normal banking channels.
The check reached the Draper Bank on December 8,
1969, at which time there was sufficient funds in the
Dixie l\Iinerals account to cover the check. The Draper
Bank returned the check for lack of l\Iiss l\iadsen's endorsement. ( R. 94). Walker Bank affixed a substitute
endorsement on the check ("credited to the account of
the within named payee") and sent it a second time
through normal channels to the Draper Bank. Prior to
the receipt of the check a second time by the Draper
1

1 Draper Bank & Trust Co., originally a co-defendant in this

action, was granted a judgment of dismissal on December 6,
1971. (R. 56).

4

Bank, the Dixie :Minerals account was attached by thir1
parties who had commenced a lawsuit against Hafe1
which resulted in a judgment against Hafen adjudg
ing that the funds in the Dixi~ _Minerals account ha(
been obtained by fraud. (R. 94-97). The check was re
turned to 'V alker Bank, who returned the check to Mis:
l\ladsen and reversed the credit entry in her savings ac
count. ( R. 186) . l\Iiss l\ladsen subsequently brough
suit against the Bank for negligence. She did not brin~
any action against l\lr. Hafen to collect the debt, an(
expressed no intention of doing so. She testified thal
Mr. Hafen told her that he felt there had been negli·
gence on the part of the Bank and that his obligatior
with regard to the debt was fulfilled. (R. 196-197).
Q.

Then, have you filed a lawsuit against
Darrell G. I-Iafen to collect your
$5,000.00?

A.

I have not, for the same reason. I feel
that he did pay me, that he did get the
money there. (R. 197).
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I

UPON DISIIONOR OF THE CHECK,
THE BANK WAS ENTITLED TO REIl\IBURSE1\1ENT FOR THE AMOUNT
OF TI-IE CHECK AND PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF
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ACTION TO REQUIRE THE BANK
TO BEAR THE LOSS ON DISHONOR.
This action was brought as a negligence action. The
testimony established that the check was handled in accordance with standard banking procedure and in
accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code Title 70A, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended. To establish negligence, l\fiss l\fodsen
would have to establish that the Bank had not acted in
accordance with the procedures established by Utah
statutory law, since the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code, especially chapters 3 and 4, are a comprehensive
scheme which sets forth the liabilities and duties of all
the parties to banking transactions. The court, however,
refused to instruct the jury on the applicability of the
Uniform Commercial Code to the case. (R. 78). Under
the facts of the case, the Code, would al1ow no recovery
by l\Iiss l\1adsen; to the contrary, the Code, as well as
pre-code law, specifically provides that under the circumstances of this case, the Bank had an absolute right
to take the action it did in charging back the amount
of the dishonored check to :Miss l\ladsen's savings account. The Bank's motion to dismiss, citing the Code,
as well as the Bank's motions for directed verdict, judgment N.O.V. or for a new trial should have been granted as a matter of law.
Under Article 4 of the Code, when a check is dishonored on presentation to the drawee, (and regardless
of the cause of dishonor) the customer has the obliga-
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tion to make the check good to the bank or other person
to whom the check is transferred. Utah Code Annotated
70A-4-207 ( 2) provides in part:
Each customer ... who transfers an item
and receives a settlement of other consideration
for it warrants to his transferee ... that ... In
addition, each customer ... so transfering an
item and receiving a settlement or other con
sideration engages that upon dishonor and any
necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will
take up the item.
The obligation to make good the dishonored check
a pp lied whether or not the check was endorsed. Utah
Code Annotated 70A-4-207 ( 3) provides in part:
The warranties and the engagement to
honor set forth in the two preceding subsections arise notwithstanding the absence of endorse1nent or words of guarantee ...
The Uank has the right to enforce this obligation
as it did in this case by charging the check back to the
customer's account. Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-212
provides in part:
"If a collecting bank has made provisional
settlement with its customer for an item and
itself fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of
payments by a bank or otherwise to receive a
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settlement for an item which is or becomes
final, the bank may revoke the settlement given
by it, charge back the amount of any credit
given for the item to its customers account, or
obtain refund ... "
Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-212 was applied by the
Utah court in First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.
Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454 P.2d 886
(1969). 21

Under Article 3 of the Code, the customer, by endorsement, makes a like engagement to pay the amount
of a dishonored check. Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-414
provides in part:
... every endorser engages that upon dishonor
and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to
its tenor at the time of his endorsement to the
holder ...
In this case, the Bank, as transferee for value,
would have the right to compel such endorsement if the
remedy of chargeback to the account were not available.
21

The Lundahl case was decided on the fact that the First
Security had not given timely notice of dishon<?r, an issue
not raised here. The right of charge-back provided by the
Code is also provided contractually in th~ Walker Bank ~ass
book savings agreement, an agreement Miss Madaen adnutted
familiarity with. (R. 203, exhibit 2P).
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Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-201 ( 3) provides in part
... any transfer for value of an instrument not
then payable to bearer gives the transferee the
specifically enforceable right to have the unqualified endorsement of the transferor...
A prime purpose of the Uniform Commercial Codi
is to provide uniformity and certainty in commercial
and banking transactions. 31 If a society is to have th1
convenience of a medium of exchange other than cash,
we must know with absolute certainty precisely whal
will happen under the various possible circumstance!
and conditions of using commercial paper. For thii
reason the Code establishes warranties and undertaking!
which determine, with certainty, the liability on an in·
strument at any stage of its negotiation, whatever thi
reason for a dispute as to liability. Such certainty ii
necessary, for, in today's high-volume banking, theri
could be no such thing as payment by check if bankl
were continually embroiled in la-wsuits, such as this one,
to determine where the loss should lie for one bad check.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code is definite, and
it is the law of the State of Utah. Under the Code Misi
:Madsen has suffered no damage, for under Article~
on Commercial Paper and Article 4 on Bank Deposits
and Collections, .Miss :Madsen is liable to the Bank for
the amount of a check which she deposited to her ac3/ See Official Code Comment to Uniform Commercial Code sec·
tion 4-101, II Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, P· 6.
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count and which was later dishonored. The obligation
of a customer of a bank to make good a dishonored
check deposited to his account is not, of course, new to
the Uniform Commercial Code. The effect of the
action of the court below, however, is to impose upon
the Bank a duty which has never been imposed upon
banks either prior or subsequent to the passage of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the duty to guarantee to
the customer the performance of the customer's own
duty in the transaction, that of endorsing the check over
to the Bank.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHO'V
THAT THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT, AND THAT THE ISSUE
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUB1\UTTED TO THE JURY. THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THAT
ISSUE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.
Assuming arguendo that the Utah Uniform Commercial Code did not apply to this case, the Bank would
still not be liable to :Miss l\Iadsen, for the facts do not
make out a case of common-law negligence. According
to Miss :Madsen's own testimony, she endorsed ten to
fifteen other checks and gave them to the teller who
gave her a receipt. Then Miss Madsen asked the teller
to phone the Draper Bank and the teller took the check

IO
and went to the next cage and used the telephone there.
( R. 183, 184). The teller then returned with the checK
and said that the funds were in the Draper Bank and
then deposited the amount to l\Iiss l\fadsen's saving~
account. ( R. 1 85) . Other testimony established that
from this point the check would have been picked up
with others from the tellers cage by a bank messenger,
delivered to the Bank's computer center where deposi!
amounts were run and balanced, and then the checx
would have been forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank
for forwarding to the out-of-town payee bank. (R. 109·
llO). Uncontroverted testimony established that the
check handling procedures were in accordance witn
banking regulations, J;-.ederal Reserve Operating Procedures, clearing-house rules, and the customs ana
usages of banks in Utah. (R. ll0-1 ll). Such facts are
insufficient as a matter of law to establish liability for
negligence. 4 / The Bank's motion to dismiss or for a
directed verdict, made at the close of the Plaintiffi
case, and re-made at the end of the trial, should have
been granted for no prima facie showing of negligence
4/ The common law presumption that compliance with the c~stom

and usage of the trade constitute the exercise of ordinary
care is codified with regard to bank procedures in the u(~li
form Commercial Code. Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-103
provides in p2.rt:

Action or inaction approved by this chapt~r or pu~
rnant to Federal Rese~ve Regula~ions or operatmg ~ett:be
·constitutes the exercise of ordmary care and,. rn .
ab8ence of special instructions, action or ~onaction.t~na
sistent with clearinghouse ru.les and the hke .or : ter,
general banking usage not disapproved by this c P
prima fac-ie constitutes the exercise of due care.
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the part of the Bank had been made. The submission
to the jury of the Special Verdict form (R. 92) was
clearly error.

-011

Liability for negligence at common law requires
three elements: 1. A duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant; 2. Negligent performance of that duty by the
defendant through the lack of the requisite degree of
care; 3. Damage to the plaintiff proximately caused by
the negligence. 5 / l\Iiss Madsen's case for damages for
negligence fails at the outset, for the Bank had no duty
at law to discover her error in not endorsing the check.
l\Iiss l\Iadsen herself testified that she understood that
it was her duty to endorse the check, (R. 199-200, 204)
that she understood that the check could not be negotiated if she did not endorse it, ( R. 200, 204) that she
understood that if she endorsed the check she promised
to take it back if it was no good, (R. 205) and that she
gave the llank no special instructions for handling the
check. (R. 195-196). In the absence of some special
undertaking on the part of the Bank, or of some special
contract with Miss Madsen, the Bank's only duty was
to use ordinary care in handling the item. There was no
evidenciary showing that the Bank used other than
ordinary care in handling the item. The only possible
time, in the normal handling of the check, for the Bank
to catch and correct l\iiss :Madsen's error in not endorsing
5/

The Restatement expresses these three ~leme!lts as (1) an interest protected against unintentional mvas1on, (2) ~onduct
which is negligent with regard to the person whose mterest
is protected, and, (3) the conduct is the legal cause of the
invasion of the interest. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, I 281.
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the check was at the teller's cage, before the teller put
the check into the pick-up box for the hank messenger.
( R. 271). At the only point in time when the lhnk
could have caught the error, .l\Iiss :Madsen was still
standing at the teller's window, able to correct the error
herself. ( R. 200-20 l) . The proximate cause of Miss
:Madsen's loss was not the manner in which the Bank
handled the check, but was her own negligent omission
in not endorsing the check in the first place.

POINT Ill
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S
O'VN NEGLIGENCE INF AILING TO
ENDORSE THE CHECK 'VAS THE
PROXIl\lATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS.
THE COURT BELOvV IMPROPERLY
REFUSED TO INS TR U CT THE
.JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Assuming, arguendo, that a showing of negligence
on the part of the bank had been made, :Miss Madsen's
recovery of damages would still be ·barred by her con·
tributary negligence. There is no question from the
testimony that Miss l\Iadsen was negligent in deposit·
ing the check without first endorsing it, and the court
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so concluded. 61 Having held that Miss l\Iadsen was
negligent as a matter of law, the court erred in also
holding as a matter of law that the negligence of Miss
l\Iadsen did not proximately contribute to her loss. The
court apparently applied a "last-clear-chance" theory
in so concluding. There is no way in which the last-clearchance doctrine can be made to fit the facts of this case.
The last-clear-chance doctrine applies in situations
where there is an extreme risk of injury to the plaintiff and the defendant has the best opportunity to avoid
the accident. The application of the doctrine requires
the following elements: ( 1) the negligence of the defendant which brings about a dangerous situation;
( 2) negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributes to the dangerous situation; ( 3) recognition on
the part of the defendant that the situation, from the
point-of-view of the plaintiff, is out of hand, and that
only the defendant has a clear opportunity to try and
avoid the damage, the last-clear-chance; and ( 4) failure
on the part of the defendant to take that last clear op61

The ruling was made in chambers, and dces not, therefore,
appear in the rE:cord. The ruling is referred to by the court,
however, in jury instructions number 9.
The court finds that t:he plaintiff was negligent in
failing to endorse the check. You will not have to
deliberate that problem. (R. 85).
The ruling is also reflected in the fact that the court refused
to give jury instructions on contributory negligence as a bar
to recovery. The Bank's exceptions to the court's jury instructions and objections to the court's not giving instructions on
contributory negligence or on the application of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code are found at R. 276-277. The
Bank's proposed instructions are found at R. 64-80. The instructions which the court did give are found at R. 81-91.
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portunity to avoid the damage. In the case at bar, none
of these necessary elements to the application of the
doctrine are present, except the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff. The situation which caused the damage,
the unendorsed check, was not brought about by the
negligence of the Bank, hut to the contrary was brought
about by the negligence of .l\Iiss .l\Iadsen. The l3ank
was not presented with a recognizably out-of-control
situation which only the Bank could correct. The only
time when the Bank could have caught the error was
concurrent in time with the last opportunity lVIiss l\Iadsen had to correct the error, that is, at the teller's cage
when l\Iiss l\I adsen presented the check. 'Vhen the
Bank was made aware of the situation, that is, when
the check was returned for an endorsement, the ·Bank
did act. Tke Bank then supplied a substitute endorse·
ment and sent the check back through the collection
process.
The Utah court has addressed the doctrine of last·
clear-chance on many occasions, and has quoted with
approval the analysis of the last-clear-chance doctrine
expressed in the Restatement of Torts. 7 I The Restate·
ment analysis is found in two sections, § 479 which
deals with. the situation of the helpless plaintiff, and
§ 480 which deals with the inattentive plaintiff. Neither
7I

All of the Utah cases are, of course, personal injury accident
cases. The application of the doctrine to a -bank check case
appears without precedent. To consider an unendorsed c~eck

as a dangerous situation is patently -:>bsured. See espec1ally

Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154.
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section can be made to fit the facts of this case. Section
479 reads as follows:
§ 479.
Plaintiff

Last-Clear-Chance: H e l p less

A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's
subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the
harm,

(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by
the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care,
and
(b) the defendant is negligent in failing
to utilize with reasonable care and competence
his then existing opportunity to avoid the
harm, when he
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation
and realizes or has reason to realize the
peril involved in it or
(ii) would discover the situation and
thus have reason to realize the peril, if he
were to exercise the vigilance which it is
then his duty to the plaintiff to exercise.
2 Restatement of Torts 2d, p. 530.
The application of § 479 to the facts of the case,
and the Respondent's theory of the case, reveals that
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the doctrine does not apply. If it is said that l\1iss l\1adsen's negligence in not endorsing the check subjected
her to risk of harm from the Bank's subsequent negligence in not discovering that l\1iss l\ladsen had failed
to endorse the check, she still may not recover, for at
the time and place when the Bank could have discovered
the error, that is, when the check was presented to the
teller, l\Iiss l\Iadsen herself could have avoided harm by
the exercise of reasonable diligence and c are.
( § 479 (a) ) . Furthermore, even if l\Iiss l\1adsen were
helpless to avoid the harm, it would have to be established that the Bank either knew of her helplessness or
should have discovered her helplessness and subsequently
failed to help her. ( § 479 (b) ) . There is no reason under
the facts for the teller to suppose that l\1iss l\1adsen
was helpless to endorse the Hafen check when she had,
a moment before, deposited ten to fifteen other checks
all properly endorsed.
A similar application of the facts of the case, to
§ 480 brings the same result. § 480 reads as follows:
§ 480.
Plaintiff

Last-Clear-Chance:

Inattentive

A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance, could discover the danger created by
the defendant's negligence in time to avoid the
harm to him, can recover if, but only if, the
defendant
(a) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realizes or has reason to realize that
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the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the
harm, and
( c) thereafter is negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
2 Restatement of Torts 2d, p. 535.

§ 480 cannot apply to this case because the danger was
created not by the Bank's negligence, but by her O\\"Il
negligence in not endorsing the check; because the
Bank did not know that she failed to endorse the check;
and because the Bank did take action to correct her
error upon discovering her mistake.
The latest Utah case in point, Reese v. Proctor, 26
Utah 2d 219, 487 P.2d 1267 (1971), discusses § 479
and§ 480 of the Restaternent of Torts in the concurring
opinion of Justice Crockett, which notes that "We have
heretofore had occasion to discuss 'last-clear-chance'
situations and approve the law as summarized in Re.11taternent of Torts, §§ 479 and 480." 26 Utah 2d 219
at 223. The main opinion in Reese v. Proctor succinctly
states the aspect of the doctrine which applies to this
case.
"The last-clear-chance doctrine is applicable
to a situation where plaintiff's position of extricable peril has arisen from his own negligence only if the defendant actually knew of
plaintiff's extricable peril, Fox v. Taylor, 10
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Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154, and cases cited
therein." 26 Utah 2d 219 at 221.
In this case, :Miss l\Iadsen's position arose from her
own negligence in not endorsing the check. There was
no showing that the Bank had any knowledge that l\iiss
l\Iadsen had failed to endorse the check until it was returned for lack of l\Iiss l\Iadsen's endorsement. It was
through no fault of the Bank, furthermore, that the
maker's account had been attached because of alleged
fraud; l\fiss l\I adsen, not the Bank, had all of the dealings with the signer of the check.
CONCLUSION
In order that checks and other negotiable instruments can be used as a money substitute, a primary purpose of the law of negotiable instruments at common
law, in prior codifications and in the present Uniform
Commercial Code has been to provide the certainty in
banking transactions without which no system of exchange can operate. The law is certain, and under that
law the Bank is not liable to l\fiss :Madsen. l\Iiss l\1adsen's proper remedy is against the maker of the check,
and that remedy is still available to her.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in
not granting the Appellant's motion to dismiss or for
a directed verdict; in refusing to instruct the jury on
the applicability of the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code to the case; in refusing to instruct the jury on
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contributory negligence; and in not granting the Appellant's motion for judgment N.O.V. or for a new
trial. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court should be reversed and that this court
should hold that recovery of damages by Miss Madsen
from Walker Bank is barred as a matter of law, and
that the complaint of .Miss .Madsen against Walker
Bank should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD J. l\1cDONOUGH of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

